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Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this 
paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy 
lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions 
to the public good. In particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is a 
crucial determinant for the existence of interior matching equilibria. In addition, we explore 
which matching mechanisms show Warr neutrality and how the size of the economy affects 
the possibility of implementing a certain type of Pareto optimal solutions through matching. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Pigou (1920) it has become a quite familiar idea in Public Finance to use taxes and 
subsidies for allocative purposes, i.e., to steer individual behaviour in a welfare-improving 
way. In the ongoing debate on climate-change policy such mechanisms have been proposed 
by several authors (see, e.g., Barrett 1990, Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner 1996, and Nordhaus 
2006) to foster international cooperation on the provision of climate protection as an 
important global public good. In parallel with this literature, a special branch of the theory of 
voluntary provision of public goods has evolved that analyzes how public good provision may 
become more efficient by applying some “matching mechanism” under which the public good 
contributions at least of some agents are subsidized by other agents. In this way, the public 
good prices that the subsidized agents actually have to pay are lowered, quite similar as in 
Lindahl´s (1919) classical approach, and this change makes them prefer a higher provision 
level of the public good than in the non-coopertive Nash equilibrium. 
        Beginning with Guttman (1978, 1987), Roberts (1987, 1992), and Boadway, Pestieau 
and Wildasin (1989), the theoretical contributions on such subsidy or matching schemes for 
public goods have been concentrated on the following questions: How are individual 
incentives to make voluntary contributions to a public good altered by a matching mechanism 
just when agents look through the veil of the global budget constraint (Falkinger and Brunner 
1999)? What subgame perfect matching equilibria will be attained when individuals 
independently choose their matching rates at the first and then their public good contributions 
at the second stage of a two-stage game (Danziger and Schnytzer 1991, Althammer and 
Buchholz 1993, Varian 1994a,b, Boadway, Song and Tremblay 2007)? Which conditions 
ensure uniqueness of matching equilibria (Andreoni and Bergstrom 1996, Falkinger 1996, 
Falkinger and Brunner 1999, Kirchsteiger and Puppe 1997)? 
    One  crucial  condition,  however,  has  been  given little attention. This is the matter of 
whether matching equilibria can be guaranteed to exist. Only if existence is ensured does 
further analysis of matching equilibria, such as uniqueness, make sense at all. In the following 
we therefore will explore the existence issue in a systematic way. To do so, we build on the 
“aggregative game approach”, as newly developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007), 
which by now has become an important instrument for the analysis of public good economies. 
Of special interest in the context of matching are linear matching schemes and, as it is 
standard in the theory of private provision of a public good, interior solutions where all agents 
voluntarily choose a strictly positive contribution to the public good. In the literature there is, 
in contrast to the uniqueness issue, only a rather casual treatment of the existence of interior   2
solutions, which, e.g., in Falkinger (1996) and Falkinger and Brunner (1999) is simply 
assumed. As a consequence it does not become very transparent what the determinants of 
existence are and when an interior matching equilibrium can be expected. Also the general 
and abstract existence proof in Bergstrom and Andreoni (1995), which is based on Brouwer´s 
fixed point theorem, does not provide any information on this  
    Related to existence of an interior matching equilibrium is Warr neutrality (e.g., Warr 1982, 
1983, or Cornes and Sandler 1996) which is another central topic in the theory of public 
goods: If an interior solution is not altered by a small perturbation of the income distribution 
and thus Warr neutrality applies existence is, for quite trivial reasons, still ensured after such a 
change of the income distribution. But if Warr neutrality does not hold an interior equilibrium 
will no longer exist even if the change of the income distribution is very small. We will show 
in this paper that such a violation of Warr neutrality is not exceptional for matching equilibria 
but can be excluded by introducing special assumptions for the matching. 
            In our analysis we will proceed as follows: After describing the framework and 
characterizing linear matching mechanisms in Section 2, we will in Section 3 use the 
aggregative game approach (for a summary presentation of this approach also see Cornes 
2009) to determine first of all solutions which are candidates for interior matching equilibria. 
Based on this we show in Section 4 that existence of interior matching equilibria crucially 
depends on the distribution of initial income among the agents (or in the case of international 
public goods among countries) and that the conditions for existence are much stricter than in 
the standard model of voluntary provision of a public good without matching. In Section 5 we 
then provide a general criterion for local Warr neutrality of a matching mechanism which is 
equivalent to that for uniqueness of the equilibrium. Thus our analysis sheds new light on the 
uniqueness issue that is a major topic in the existing literature on matching with public goods. 
In Section 6 we consider special matching schemes that fulfil this criterion. Among those are 
on the one hand a cyclical mechanism and on the other a new groupwise mechanism for 
which there is asymmetric matching between two groups and which may implement the 
salient Pareto optimal solution where all agents have the same marginal rate of substitution 
between the private and the public good. In Section 7 we show how increasing the size of the 
economy by replication affects existence of matching equilibria and, in particular, the 
suitability of matching schemes to implement specific Pareto-optimal allocations. Section 8 
concludes. 
   3
2. The Framework 
There  are  n  agents (“countries”)  1,..., iN =  with utility functions  ( , ) ii uxG where  i x  is 
private consumption of agent i  and  G   is public good supply. All utility functions are 
assumed to be twice partially differentiable, strictly monotone increasing in both variables and 
strictly quasi-concave. In order to avoid the tedious analysis of corner solutions all 
indifference curves stemming from these preferences are assumed to be tangential to the 
coordinate axis. Moreover, we suppose that both the private and the public good are strictly 
normal for any agent  1,..., . in =  Agent  i ´s initial private good endowment (“income”) is 








where  ii i zwx =−  is agent i´s total contribution to the public good. So we assume that all 
agents are equally productive in providing the public good and that the thus homogeneous 
productivity parameter is normalised to  1 a = . But it would also be possible to extend the 
analysis and some of the results of this paper to public good models where the marginal rate 
of transformation between the private and the public good may differ between the agents (see, 
e.g., Cornes and Sandler 1989, Ihori 1996, and Kotchen 2009 for various specifications of 
such models). 
      In the case of matching as considered here,  i z  will consist of two parts: the direct flat 
contribution  i y  to the public good chosen by agent i and her indirect contribution that she 
makes by matching the flat contributions of the other agents  j i ≠ . As borrowing is excluded 
both components can never become negative, which has in the literature been coined as no-
bankruptcy condition.  
      We will restrict attention to linear matching schemes with constant matching rates 0 ij μ ≥ . 
The exogenously given parameter  ij μ  indicates by how much in terms of own contributions to 
the public good agent i augments any unit of flat contributions made by some other agent 
j i ≠ . The budget constraint of agent  1,..., in =  then becomes    4
(1)                           
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which says that agent ´ is income  i w   is divided into her private consumption  i x , her flat 









∑   that are conditional on the 
other  1 n−  agents´ flat contributions  j y . Whereas eq. (1) looks at agent  ´ is role as a donor 
under the given matching mechanism her role as recipient and thus the induced change of her 
incentive to make contributions to the public good is determined by the aggregate matching 
rate 










which describes how much the other agents add to the flat contribution of agent i . The 
reciprocal value 1/ i σ  then is the marginal rate of transformation between the private and the 
public good and thus the price agent i has to pay for any additional unit of the public good 
under the given matching mechanism.  
       In the literature several tax-transfer mechanisms have been proposed under which agents 
pay taxes to finance subsidies for public good supply. These mechanisms can, as we will see 
now, be interpreted as special linear matching schemes. A conceptual difference, however, is 
that in the tax-transfer approach the action parameter of any agent is not her flat contribution 
i y  as in our matching approach but rather the gross contribution  i g  that includes the subsidy 
payments. Thus the relationship between agent i ´s gross contribution  i g   and her net flat 
contribution is  (1 ) ii i gy σ =+  where  i σ   is defined by (2). The most important subsidy 
schemes are as follows: 
(i) The tax-transfer-scheme conceived by Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) is equivalent to a 
matching mechanism whose matching rates are given by   5





















= ∑  and  ( ] 0,1 β ∈ . The parameters  1 ( ,..., ) n ss  denote 
the individual agents’ tax shares and β stands for the rate by which individual contributions i g  
are subsidized. 
(ii) In the subsidy scheme as devised by Falkinger (1996), the whole group of agents 
{ } 1,..., I n =  is divided into distinct k  subgroups  1,..., k I I  of size  1,..., k nn . Then deviations of 










− ∑  
of the other agents in her group  l I  are rewarded or punished by the rate  0 β > . This subsidy 
scheme boils down to a linear matching mechanism whose matching rates are given by eq. (4) 
if the subsidized agent  j  is in the same subgroup  l I  as agent i.  











If, however, agents i and  j  are in different subgroups we have  0
F
ij μ = . Thus the Falkinger-
mechanism is characterized by the properties that matching only occurs within subgroups 
(and not between them) and that the matching rates are identical for all members of a specific 
subgroup.  
     Given any linear matching scheme a Nash equilibrium in which all agents´ optimal choices 
of flat contributions are consistent is defined in the following way. 
Definition 1: For a given matching mechanism, given preferences and incomes, an n-tuple 
1 ( ,..., )
M M
n y y  with  0
M
i y ≥  for all  1,..., in =  is a matching equilibrium in flat contributions if 
for any agent  1,..., in =  the flat contribution 
M
i y  maximizes utility 
(5)                                        
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=+ ∑∑   denotes public good supply that is generated by the flat 
contributions of all agents  j i ≠  and the concomitant matching contributions.   6
       Just as the existing literature we are primarily interested in interior matching equilibria in 
which each agent makes a strictly positive flat contribution 0
M
i y > . As a next step we will 
therefore work out those allocations which are the candidates for interior matching equilibria. 
For this purpose we make use of the aggregative game approach (Cornes and Hartley 2003, 
2007) which, as in many other situations of public good provision, considerably facilitates the 
analysis.  
 
3. A Characterization of Potential Interior Matching Equilibria 
For any given aggregate matching rate  i σ  attributed to agent i as a recipient let  ( ,1 ) ii eG σ +  
denote agent  ´ is income expansion path along which agent  ´ is marginal rate of substitution 
between the private and the public good is equal to 1 i σ + . Having strict normality both of the 
private and the public good, each  ( ,1 ) ii eG σ +   is defined for all  0 G >   and is strictly 
increasing in G . We then have the following definition that characterizes the candidates for 
interior matching equilibria through the lens of the aggregative game approach. (For a similar 
approach in some other context of public good theory see Shrestha and Cheong 2007) 
Definition 2: A feasible allocation  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , ) n x xG is  called  a  potential interior matching 
equilibrium PIME for a given matching mechanism, given preferences and income levels if  
(6)                                
11
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==
++ = = ∑∑         and 
(7)                                 ˆ ˆ (, 1 ) ii i xe G σ =+    for all   1,..., . in =  
Note that for this definition of a PIME it is not essential that agent i´s private consumption  ˆi x  
must not exceed her income  i w . The term PIME is justified by the following result, which 
provides a necessary condition for interior matching equilibria. 
Proposition 1: If, for a given matching mechanism, given preferences and given income 
levels, the allocation  1 ( ,..., , )
MM M
n x xG  is an interior matching equilibrium, then it must be a 
PIME. 
Proof: By the given matching mechanism agent i´s marginal rate of transformation between 
the private and the public good is changed to  1 ii mrt σ = + . Then, if agent i makes a strictly 
positive flat contribution in the Nash equilibrium for the given matching scheme, she must   7
attain a position where her marginal rate of substitution is equal to this personal marginal rate 
of transformation, i.e.,  1 ii mrs σ =+  holds. From the definition of income expansion paths, it 
then directly follows that eq. (6)  is  fulfilled for any agent  1,..., in =  that makes a strictly 








=∑ being available in the economy is 








+= ∑  as 
the aggregate budget constraint. Inserting (7) then shows that condition (6) is fulfilled.    QED 
    Under standard assumptions on preferences, existence and uniqueness of a PIME is always 
ensured which is shown by the following proposition.  
Proposition 2: For a given matching mechanism, given preferences and given income levels 
the PIME, as described by Definition 2, exists and is unique. 
Proof: Because of the strict monotonicity of all income expansion paths (as implication of 
strict normality) the solution described by Proposition 1 is uniquely determined given the 
utility functions  ( , ) ii uxG, aggregate income W  and  the  parameters  ij μ  of  the  matching 
mechanism. Since  (0,1 ) 0 ii e σ +=  for  all  agents i  and  lim ( ,1 ) ii G eG σ
→∞ + =∞  for at least one 
agent i, such a solution exists for all levels W of aggregate income.                        QED 
    By  letting  0 ij μ =  for  all  , 1,..., ij N =  with ij ≠ , the PIME-concept clearly includes the 
standard interior Nash equilibrium of voluntary provision of a public good without matching 
(see Cornes and Sandler 1985, 1996, and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986) as a special 
case. It is also easy to see when a PIME gives a Pareto-optimal solution.  
Proposition 3: A PIME is Pareto-optimal if and only if 






i i σ =
=
+ ∑ . 
Proof: As in an interior matching equilibrium  1 ii mrs σ = +  holds for any agent i´s marginal 





i i mrs =
= ∑  for Pareto optimality in a public good economy is equivalent to (8).              QED 
     As a special case we now consider PIMEs in which all agents are treated symmetrically in 
the sense that each receives the same aggregate matching rate σ , i.e.,  i σ σ =  holds for each   8






 or  1 n σ =− , which in 
particular is obtained if  1 ij μ =  for  all  , 1,..., ij n =  with ij ≠ . Then, each agent augments 
some flat contribution of any other agent by the same amount.  
      Based on the characterization given by Proposition 1 it is now also possible to do some 
comparative statics on PIMEs. In particular, it can be demonstrated in an elementary way that 
Warr neutrality applies, i.e., that a PIME is invariant to redistribution of initial income.  
Proposition 4: (i) If aggregate income is redistributed among agents, public good supply and 
private consumption of all agents are not changed in a PIME. 
 (ii) If aggregate income is increased, public good supply and private consumption of each 
agent i will increase. 
(iii) If some matching rate  ij σ  is increased, public good supply and private consumption of all 
agents except agent j  will increase, too. Private consumption of the recipient agent j  will 
fall. 
Proof: (i) This assertion directly follows from (6) as this condition only depends on total 
income W and not on its distribution among the agents. 
(ii) By increasing total income and thus the right hand side of eq. (6) the equilibrium positions 
of all agents shift outwards along their income expansion paths  ( ,1 ) ii eG σ +  which implies 
that both total public good supply and private consumption of all agents are increased. 
(iii) If  ij μ   goes up agent  ´ j s   personal rate of transformation between the private and the 
public good is increased to some 1 j σ′ +  such that – by convexity of indifference curves – 
agent  j ´s income expansion path is shifted inwards, i.e.,  (, 1 ) (, 1 ) jj jj eG eG σ σ ′ + <+  for all 
0 G >  as depicted in Figure 1 for the case of two agents.    9
 
Figure 1: The two-agent case with a rise in one agent’s matching rate from σ2 to σ2’. 
Then at  ˆ G  which is the level of public good supply in the original matching equilibrium we 
have 
(9)                      
11
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Because each income expansion path is strictly increasing in G , public good supply must 
increase to restore equality in (9). Therefore,  ˆˆ GG ′ >  holds for public good supply  ˆ G′ in the 
new matching equilibrium. This further gives  ˆˆ ˆˆ ( , 1)( , 1) kk k k k k x eG s eG s x ′′ = +> +=  for  the 
levels of private consumptions of all agents kj ≠ . As the aggregate income W  is assumed to 
be constant here and public good supply as well as private consumption of all other agents 
increase, private consumption of agent  j  must definitely fall.        QED 
   After having described PIMEs as candidates for interior matching equilibria we will now 
explore the conditions under which a PIME emerges as the true interior matching equilibrium 
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4. Distribution of Income and the Existence of Interior Matching Equilibria 
From the standard theory of private provision of a public good it is well known (see already 
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986) that an interior Nash equilibrium with strictly positive 
contributions of all agents is only obtained when total income is distributed in a certain way. 
It is an important merit of the aggregative game approach that it directly provides a necessary 
and sufficient condition on the income distributions required for that: Consider the PIME for 
the case  0 ij μ =  for  all  , 1,..., ij n =  and  ij ≠ , which gives the standard interior Nash 
equilibrium without matching. Then, if ˆii x w <   holds for the given income distribution 
1,..., n ww   and any agent  1,..., in = , the Nash equilibrium  1 ( ,..., , )
NN N
n x xG  of  voluntary 
provision of the public good coincides with the PIME, and it is attained by having 
ˆ
NN
iii i gyw x == −  as agent i ´s contribution to the public good (see Buchholz, Cornes and 
Peters 2006).  
      With matching, however, matters become more complicated, and the conditions on the 
admissible income distributions become more restrictive. This is already seen by looking at a 
very simple example with two agents that have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function 
(,) ii i uxG x G = . When  12 21 1 μ μμ == =  the PIME which then is Pareto-optimal is given by 
ˆ 1 G =  and  12
1 ˆˆ
2
xx == when  2 W =   is assumed. In order to obtain this PIME as the true 
interior matching equilibrium for some distribution  12 (,) ww  of total income  2 W =  among the 
two agents there must be strictly positive flat contributions  1 y  and  2 y   for which the 
individual budget constraints 
(10)                               
1 ˆ 1
2
ii j i j i x yy yy w μ ++ =++ ⋅=    
are fulfilled for  ,1 , 2 ij = . This condition, however, demands that income has to be distributed 
equally, i.e.,  12 1 ww ==   holds. Even a small deviation from the symmetric income 
distribution has the effect that the PIME no longer is the matching equilibrium even if 
1 ˆ
2
ii wx >= still  holds  for  1,2 i = , i.e., if the conditions that would guarantee the interior 
solution in the case without matching apply.  
      With an unequal income distribution the matching equilibrium in our example becomes a 
corner solution instead: Without loss of generality, we may assume that  12 ww < . Then in all   11
matching equilibria agent 1 makes a zero flat contribution  1 0




w > , then agent 2´s 




y =   such that public good supply 
becomes  2
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, we get  21
M yw =  which 
gives  1 2
M Gw =  and  1 0
M x =  and  22 1




w <  the flat contribution of 












==  and again  1 0
M x = . This is a quite 
extreme solution since it implies that agent 2, if she is poor enough, will be completely 
impoverished through the matching mechanism. The determination of such corner solutions is 
not straightforward, even in this simple case with only two agents. Details of the proof can be 
obtained from the authors on request. This example shows that, as compared to the standard 
case of voluntary public good provision without matching, more restrictive conditions 
characterise income distributions for which an interior matching equilibrium is in fact 
attained. To facilitate the exposition we introduce the following notations. 
Definition 3: For a given matching mechanism, given preferences and given total income W , 
•  Denote by Π the set of all income distributions  1 ( ,..., ) n ww  for which  ˆ ii wx >  = private 
consumption of agent i in PIME for all  1,..., in = , and 
•  Denote by Ω the set of all income distributions  1 ( ,..., ) n ww  for which the matching 
equilibrium coincides with the PIME. 
   If  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ∈Ω we will also say that the PIME is implemented by the given matching 













 which geometrically describes the set of all feasible distributions 
of total income W   among the agents in the 
n   -space. Clearly, under the no-bankruptcy 
condition we have Ω⊂Π, and the example considered above shows that with matching it is 
well possible that Ω is smaller than Π. The next proposition, which is one of the main results 
of the paper, provides a criterion that shows which income distributions are in Ω and which 
are not.   12
Proposition 5: For a given matching scheme, given preferences and given total income W , 
some distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ∈Π  is an element of Ω   if and only if the system of the n 
equations with the n unknowns  1,..., n y y  
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j
ji
y yzw x μ
=
≠
+= = − ∑             for  1,..., in =  
has a solution  1,..., n y y %%  with strictly positive flat contributions  0 i y > %  for all agents  1,..., in = .  
Proof: “Only if”: As a consequence of Proposition 1, private consumption of each agent 
1,..., in =   in an interior matching equilibrium must be equal to its PIME level ˆii x w < . If 
1 ,...,
M M
n yy  are the agents´ flat contributions in the interior matching equilibrium then agent 
´ is budget constraint is  
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++ = ∑ . 
Since (12-i) is identical to (11-i) for any  1,..., in = , the system of equations described by (11-i) 
is solved by  1 ,...,
M M
n y y , which are all strictly positive as an interior solution has been 
assumed.  
“If”: Consider an arbitrary agent i and assume that all other agents  j i ≠  have chosen the flat 
contributions  j y %  which are the solutions of the equations given by (11-i). Agent  ´ isoptimal 
reaction to the (1 ) n− -tuple of these flat contributions and thus to aggregate public good 
supply  i G− %  of the other agents then is obtained by maximizing utility 
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∑ %%  since the budget constraints of any agent have to be 
respected. From the condition given by (11-i) it follows that  ii y y = %  lies in the interior of this 
interval and thus is an admissible flat contribution for agent i . If agent i  now  actually  
chooses  ii y y = %  as her flat contribution this (together with the flat contributions  j y %  of the   13
agents j i ≠ ) gives the level of public good supply  ˆ G  as provided in the PIME, which is 
shown by summing up all n   equations (11-i) (since the left hand side of any of these 
equations gives the total public good contribution of each agent). Then, also from (11-i), it is 
immediate that agent i by choosing  i y %  as flat contribution, attains her PIME-position  ˆ ˆ (,) i x G ,  










+∑  and thus is equal to her 
personal marginal rate of transformation under the given matching scheme. This shows that 
agent  ´ is choice of the flat contribution  i y %  is indeed her best reply when all other agents  j i ≠  
have decided to make the flat contributions  j y % . Since this consideration can be applied to all 
agents  1,..., in =  the “If”-part of the proposition has been proven.                                     QED                          
     To  illustrate  how  the  condition  given  in Proposition 5 narrows the range of income 
distributions that yield an interior matching equilibrium we consider the case with two agents 
1,2 i =  again but with a general linear matching scheme for which the matching rates are now 
abbreviated by  11 2 μ μ =  and  22 1 μ μ = . The system of equations described by eq. (11-i) then 
becomes 
(14-1)                                            11 21 y yz μ +=  
(14-2)                                            22 12 y yz μ +=   
which, if  12 1 μ μ ≠ , has the solution       
























Combining (15-1) and (15-2) and observing that  1 y %  and  2 y %   must be strictly positive, an 
interior matching equilibrium is obtained in the case1 with  12 1 μ μ <  , if and only if  1 z  and  2 z  
fulfil the following condition 








In the case 2 with  12 1 μ μ >  the analogous condition is   14








Inserting  ˆ ii i zwx =−  for  1,2 i =  in the case  12 1 μ μ <  , the inequalities in (16-1) transform into 
the following condition that directly refers to income distributions  12 (, ) ww : 
(17)                                 2 2 11 2 2 11
1
1 ˆˆ ˆˆ () () x wx w x wx μ
μ
+− < < +− . 
The restriction on the income distributions provided by (17) can be visualised in a  1 w - 2 w -




 and  2 l  the straight line with 
slope  2 μ  both passing through the point  12 ˆˆ (,) Ax x = . Then condition (17) means, that the set 
Ω of income distributions leading to an interior matching equilibrium is represented by the 
segment BC  whose endpoints are the points of intersection of  1 l  and  2 l  with the negatively 
sloped 45°-line of constant total income  12 wwW + = . Since  12 1 μ μ < , the line  1 l  lies above 
2 l   such that the set Ω   is not empty, if  2 n = . It is also obvious from Figure 2 that the 
segment DE, which represents all income distributions that have ˆii x w <  for  1,2 i =  and thus 
the set Π, is much larger than BC . 
 











1 ˆ x  
2 ˆ x
2 ˆ x  15
The case  12 1 μ μ >   can be treated by a quite analogous analysis which, however, will be 
omitted here. 
     Condition (17) and Figure 2 are helpful for exploring how the set Ω changes if the match- 
ing parameters  1 μ  and  2 μ   are varied. In particular we assume that both  1 μ  and  2 μ  are 
increased which implies that  1 l  becomes  flatter and  2 l   becomes steeper. In Figure 2 this 






or  12 1 μ μ =  , the straight lines  1 l  and  2 l  coincide. Then only one single income distribution is 
left over for which an interior matching equilibrium is obtained. The case  12 1 μ μ =  is  of 








 which is the Samuelson rule for the PIME given  1 μ  and  2 μ . 
Therefore, income must be distributed in a very specific way if a Pareto optimal allocation is 
to be implemented through a matching scheme. This generalizes the result we have reached 
earlier on for the case  12 1 μ μ == .   
                So we can conclude that in the case with only two agents it is a rather unlikely eventuality 
that an efficient solution is obtained through matching since there is exactly one distribution 
of income for which the expected Pareto-optimal solution is brought about. These extreme 
demands on the income distribution are completely independent of the underlying 
preferences. 
   If there is the possibility that the set Ω is so small that it only contains a single element one 
might even suspect that there is no income distribution at all for which an interior matching 
equilibrium is obtained. But fortunately this is not the case as the following proposition 
shows. 
Proposition 6: For a given matching mechanism, given preferences and given total income 
W  the  set  Ω  is  not  empty  and  contains an income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ( (  with  strictly 
positive components  0 i w > (  for all  1,..., in = . 
Proof: Define  












% .   16
Then let income  i w (  of agent  1,..., in =  be  











( % . 
Summing up the  i w ( ´s and observing the definition in (18) and the fact that private 
consumption of all agents and public good supply must exhaust aggregate income W  gives  
(20)                 
11 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ () ( )
nn n n n n n
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wx y n x y n x G W μσ
== = = = = =
≠
=+ + =+ + =+ = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
( %% . 
Hence,  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ((  is indeed a distribution of W . It directly follows from the construction that 
0 i w > (  holds for any  1,..., in = . Finally, the comparison of (20) with (11-i) shows that  : i y y = %  
for all  1,..., in =  is a solution to the system of linear equations described by (11-i) such that, 
by Proposition 5, an interior matching equilibrium is obtained for the income distribution   
1 ( ,..., ) n ww (( .                                                                                                        QED          
   Proposition 6 in particular shows that, by an adequate distribution of income, it is always 
possible to get an interior matching equilibrium in which the flat contributions for all agents 
are of equal size.  
    That  the  existence  of  interior  matching equilibria so strongly depends on income 
distribution as shown in this section moreover suggests that the range of income redistribution 
for which Warr neutrality (and other comparative statics properties like those associated with 
increases of income or matching rates) applies is more limited as in the conventional case of 
voluntary public good provision without matching. This presumption is confirmed by the 
analysis in the next section in which the issue of Warr neutrality will be examined more 
closely. 
 
5. Local Warr Neutrality for Interior Matching Equilibria: The General Criteria 
Since the seminal work by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) it is well known that in the 
standard model of voluntary public good provision, a large income redistribution that changes 
the group of active contributors to the public good will alter the Nash equilibrium and thus 
destroy Warr neutrality. Therefore, Warr neutrality from the beginning is a local property of 
Nash equilibria which by the following definition can be extended to general linear matching 
mechanisms.   17
Definition 4: A linear matching scheme has the local Warr neutrality property for interior 
matching equilibria and is therefore called a W-scheme if and only if - for any given 
preferences and any given total income  0 W >  -  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ∈Ω  implies  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ′′ ∈Ω 






′−<  for 
some  0 ε > .  
     In the standard situation without matching this property is clearly fulfilled and, moreover, 
the maximum value for ε   that is admissible according to Definition 4 can easily be 
determined as  { } max 1,...,
ˆ min ii In wx ε
= =− . With matching, however, it crucially depends on the 
nature of the given matching mechanism whether local Warr neutrality applies or not. A 
sufficient and necessary criterion for that is provided by the following Proposition. As a 
preparation for this result we introduce the transformation matrix M  that is defined by 
































The matrix M  describes how the agents´ flat contributions  1 ( ,..., ) n y y  translate into their total 
contributions  1 ( ,..., ) n zz . To facilitate notation, the superscript “→” from now on is used to 
indicate vectors. 
Proposition 7: A matching mechanism is a W-scheme if and only if det 0 M ≠ , i.e., the 
transformation matrix is non-singular.  
Proof: “If”: Consider some  1 ( ,..., ) n ww w =∈ Ω
r
. Proposition 5 then implies that there exists 
some  y
r
% 1 ( ,..., ) n y y = %%  with  0 i y > %  for  all  1,..., in =  such  that  wM y =
r r % . If, as supposed, the 
matrix M  is non-singular its inverse 
1 A
−  exists, and 
1 y Mw
− =
s r %  holds. Since 
1 M
−  is a sup-
norm-continuous function on 
n    the vector 
1 yM w
− ′ ′ =
r r %  also has strictly positive components 
for any income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n www ′′′ = %  that is close to the original income distribution 
1 ( ,..., ) n ww w =
r
. Since wM y ′′ =
r r
, the assertion then directly follows from Proposition 5.  
“Only If”: Assume that det 0 M =  such that the matrix M  is singular. If the rank of M  then 
is mn < ,  M  maps 
n    into a hyperplane  ( )
n M Η=    with dimension m . This hyperplane   18
has a non-empty intersection with the simplex  ( ) W Γ  because  Ω   is not empty from 
Proposition 6. Since, in addition, the origin (0,...,0) obviously lies on Η  but not on  ( ) W Γ  the 
intersection ( ) W Η∩Γ  has dimension  1 m−  and thus a lower dimension than  ( ) W Γ  (which is 
1) n− . Therefore, for any element  1 ( ,..., ) n ww w =
r
% ∈ () W Η∩Γ  there is some other point in 
() W Γ  close to w
r
% , i.e., starting from w
r
%  a small redistribution of income, which does not lie 
on Η  and thus is not contained in Ω. This shows that local Warr neutrality is violated in this 
case.                                                                                                                  QED 
      The condition det 0 M ≠  which underlies Proposition 7 is tantamount to having a unique 
solution for the system of equations given by (11-i). Uniqueness of flat contributions in an 
interior matching equilibrium, however, has been in the focus of much of the existing 
literature on matching in a public goods economy (see Falkinger (1996) and Falkinger and 
Brunner 1999). By Proposition 7 it turns out that the uniqueness property is determined by 
just the same condition as local Warr neutrality. From this perspective, there is thus a double 
reason to be particularly interested in matching mechanisms for which the corresponding 
transformation matrix M  is non-singular. Note that this condition only refers to properties of 
the matching mechanism but not to specific characteristics of the economy as the preferences 
of the agents. 
     It is also an immediate consequence of Proposition 7 that small deviations from some 
originally given income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ∈Ω will destroy Warr neutrality much more if 
the rank of the matrix M  is smaller since the dimension of Η  and thus  ( ) W Η∩Γ  then is 
reduced. In the extreme, when the matrix M  has rank 1, the set  ( ) W Η∩Γ  only contains one 
single element. Such a situation, e.g., prevails for matching schemes which implement Pareto 
optimal allocations in an economy with two agents where, as has been seen above in Section 
4, only tiny deviations from the “right” income distribution will lead away from the interior 
matching equilibrium. What the general criterion as described by Proposition 7 implies in 
specific situations will now be discussed in more detail. In particular, we will explore how 
specific Pareto optimal allocations can be attained by application of matching schemes that 
show the local Warr neutrality property. 
 
 6. Specific Matching Schemes  
An outstanding Pareto-optimal solution in a public goods economy is that in which all agents 
have the same marginal rates of substitution between the private and the public good. If there   19
are n agents in the economy then, as a direct implication of the Samuelson rule, we have 
i mrs n =  for any agent  1,..., in =  in such a solution. This specific PIME in which all agents 
pay the same marginal price for the public good and in this sense are treated symmetrically 
(see Falkinger 1996) will be called  s P . The following Proposition shows that aiming at  s P  as 
matching equilibrium and at the same time imposing an additional equal treatment postulate 
will reduce the size of Ω to one such that local Warr neutrality is violated in a quite extreme 
way. 
Proposition 8: If a matching scheme implements  s P  and no agent matches other agents by 
different matching rates, the set Ω only contains a single income distribution.  
Proof: As in an interior matching equilibrium  1 ii mrs σ = +  holds for all agents it follows from 
mrs n =  (which specifically holds in  s P ) and from  ji j μ μ =  for all agents  j  and i with  j i ≠  
(which is the assumption on the matching mechanism made in the Proposition) that  









= ∑ 1 n−  
holds for each agent  1,..., in = . By adding  i μ  on both sides of eq. (23) we obtain 






n const μμ μ
=
=− − = = ∑               for all  1,..., in = . 
Also from (23) we, moreover, get ( 1) 1 nn μ − =−, which gives  1 μ = . Hence, under the 
assumptions of Proposition 8, the transformation matrix M  is 










This matrix clearly has rank 1 since all its rows are identical. Therefore, there is exactly one 
income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ( (  that yields the desired Pareto-optimal solution as an interior 
matching equilibrium.                                                                                                 QED 
         The only element of Ω that occurs in the situation described by Proposition 8 clearly 
must be identical with the income distribution that had been constructed in the proof of 
Proposition 6. According to eq. (18) all agents then make the same flat contribution  y %  whose 
level is   20









By eq. (18) the income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww ( (  which makes up Ω can be explicitly described 
by 






= + (                         for all  1,..., . in =  
Obviously, this is the same income distribution that is required to have the PIME 
corresponding to  1 i n σ σ == −  as  the  Lindahl equilibrium when the personalized Lindahl 
prices 
L




=  holds for all agents  1,..., in = . 
     Proposition 8 provides the general insight that in order to implement a Pareto-optimal 
allocation as an interior matching equilibrium which is robust against small perturbations of 
the income distribution one has to give up either uniformity of the matching rates or 
uniformity of marginal rates of substitution in the equilibrium. There are several possibilities 
by which this can be achieved and which thus lead to Pareto optimal matching equilibria. 
Some of these options will now be analyzed.   
     It is an immediate consequence of Proposition 8 that, in the case with  3 n ≥ , there exist 
innumerable possibilities to construct matching schemes that implement  s P  and that, at the 
same time, have the local Warr neutrality (and uniqueness) property. It only has to be ensured 
that all rows of the matrix M  are linearly independent and the Samuelson rule (8) as given by 
Proposition 3 is fulfilled. An important subclass which will now be considered in more detail 
consists of matching mechanisms for which some matching rates  ij μ  are zero, which means 
that at least some agents do not match the public good contributions of some other agents. A 
simple example of such a matching scheme, e.g., is given by the matching rates 
11 1 ii n n μ μ + == −  for all  1,..., 1 in =−  and  0 ij μ = for all other matching rates, i.e., agent 1 only 
matches the public good contributions of agent 2, agent 2 only those of agent 3 etc., and to 
close the scheme, agent nmatches agent 1. Thus we have a cyclical matching with  1 i n σ = −  
for each agent  1,..., in =  such that the Pareto optimal solution  s P  is implemented. That for this 
specific matching scheme the transformation matrix M  is non-singular is shown in Lemma 1 
in Appendix A1 when we specifically set  1 n μ = − . Even though a matching scheme of this 
type does not seem to be of much empirical relevance it shows that a partioning of the whole   21
economy in subgroups is actually not required to implement the Pareto optimal solution  s P  as 
a matching equilibrium. 
      A more important subclass of the matching schemes that have some zero matching rates is 
that which leads to matching on a reciprocal base: According to the do ut des principle an 
agent  i   matches just those agents j   who pay matching grants to the public good 
contributions of agent i, i.e.,  0 ij μ >  holds if and only if  0 ji μ >  for some agents  , 1,..., ij n = , 
and  0 ij μ =  for at least one pair of agents  , 1,..., ij n =  with ij ≠ . In this case matching only 
happens among the members of the same group, and when identical matching rates are 
assumed for each group a groupwise homogeneous matching scheme (as devised by Falkinger 
1996, and already described in Section 2) is obtained. Assume again that the total set of 
agents  { } 1,..., I n =   is divided into k  subgroups  1,..., k I I   where the size of subgroup  j I  is 
denoted by  j n , and  j μ  is the matching rate in group  j I . Then the following result holds. 
Proposition 9: A groupwise homogeneous matching scheme is a W-scheme if and only if 
1 j μ ≠  for each group  1,..., . j k =  
Proof: Given such a matching scheme the transformation matrix M  can be written as  


















where each  jj nn × -submatrix  j M , which is the transformation matrix for group  j I , is of the 
form 




















It follows from Lemma 2 in Appendix A2 that det 0 j M ≠  if and only if  1 j μ ≠ . The assertion 








=∏ , which is a general fact if the matrix 
M  is of the type as in (27).                                                                               QED 
    If the Samuelson rule holds for a groupwise homogeneous matching scheme, i.e.,    22










+− ∑  
with  1 j μ ≠  for all  1,..., jk = , then a Pareto-optimal solution is implemented. Condition (29) 
is not empty, which is an implication of the following Proposition. 
Proposition 10: If the number of agents n  exceeds 3, the Pareto-optimal allocation  s P  in 
which all agents have the same marginal rate of substitution can be implemented by a 

























 if  agent i  is  in 
group  i I . This shows that  s P  is implemented. The local Warr neutrality property then follows 
from Proposition 9.                                                                                        QED 
     As  local  Warr  neutrality  is  equivalent to uniqueness of the matching scheme in flat 
contributions, Proposition 10 confirms the important result by Falkinger (1996) in an 
alternative way. Note that the groupwise homogeneous matching scheme that implements  s P  
is, according to Proposition 10, not uniquely determined. Rather, the division of the whole 
group of agents into disjoint subgroups can be carried out in different ways. It only matters 
that there is some partitioning at all. So it is, e.g., possible to get local Warr neutrality by 
having subgroups of equal size  2 j n =  if the total number  4 n ≥  of agents is even such that 
matching is pairwise. If  5 n ≥ , however, is odd one may choose all subgroups of size 2 except 
one whose size is 3. Only if the total number of agents n is equal to 3, Proposition 10 cannot 
be applied and  s P  has to be implemented by another type of matching mechanism like, e.g., 
the cyclical mechanism that was described above.  
      If a matching scheme is based on a partitioning of the whole economy into different 
subgroups it is well possible to implement  s P  by an asymmetric scheme in which there is also 
matching between the groups. Such a matching scheme can, e.g., be constructed in the 
following way. Let there be two subgroups  1 I  and  2 I  in which there are  1 2 n ≥  and  2 1 n ≥  
agents, respectively. Then all members of group  1 I  match themselves in a symmetric way 
with the matching rate  1 μ  and also match the public good contributions of the agents in group 
2 I  by a possibly different matching rate  2 μ . The agents in group  2 I , however, do not match 
any other public good contribution, neither in their same group  2 I  or in the other group  1 I .   23
With regard to one-sided matching between two groups in the context of climate change or 
other global public goods, the matching group  1 I  can be interpreted as the group of rich 
industrialized countries whereas the group  2 I , whose members receive matching grants, are 
the poor developing countries. 
      The matching schemes of this type can formally be characterized by the following 
conditions: 
(30-1)                       1 ij μ μ =  if  1 , ij I ∈  with ij ≠  
(30-2)                       2 ij μ μ =  if  1 iI ∈  and  2 j I ∈  
(30-3)                       0 ij μ =    if  2 iI ∈  and all  j I ∈  
For such matching schemes we have the following result on local Warr neutrality. 
Proposition 11: A matching scheme as described by (30-1), (30-2) and (30-3) is a W-scheme 
if and only if  1 1 μ ≠ .  
Proof: Given (30-1), (30-2) and (30-3) the nn ×  transformation matrix is  




















































 and  22 M  is  the  22 nn × -
matrix 
22
1 0 ... 0
0 1 ... 0
::::








.     24
From standard rules in matrix calculus we get  11 22 11 det det det det M MM M = ⋅= since 
11 det 1. M =   As the Lemma in Appendix A2 shows that  11 det 0 M ≠   holds if and only if 
1 1 μ ≠ , the assertion of Proposition 11 directly follows from Proposition 7.     
                                                                                                       QED 
    Proposition 11 can now be applied to provide an alternative option for the implementation 
of  s P . 
Proposition 12: The allocation  s P  can be implemented by a matching scheme that fulfils 
conditions (30-1), (30-2) and (30-3). Any such matching mechanism is a W-scheme. 
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=+ =+ =   for all agents i  in  group  2 I . This shows that  s P  can  be 
implemented by such a scheme as an interior matching equilibrium. Local Warr neutrality 











.                        QED                         
     It is obvious from our general considerations in Section 5 that the one-sided mechanisms 
given by conditions (30-1), (30-2) and (30-3) also imply uniqueness in flat contributions as 
the other desirable property of interior matching equilibria. 
 
7. Increasing the Size of the Economy  
Since Olson (1965) it has been a central issue in the theory of public goods how the size of the 
economy affects the possibility of attaining an efficient solution (see Sandler 1992, pp. 52-54, 
for a formal treatment in the standard case of voluntary public good provision). In order to 
analyze this question in the matching context we assume that the originally given economy 
with  2 n ≥  agents (that, as above, is characterized by utility functions  ( , ) ii uxG and income 
levels  i w  for  1,..., in = ) is replicated m  times. In any replication economy we consider the 
specific Pareto optimal PIME  ( ) s Pmin which  1 j mn σ = ⋅− holds for any agent  1,..., jm n =⋅  
such that the marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good is 
mrs m n =⋅  for all agents. By  ˆ() Gm we denote public good supply in  ( ) s Pm and by  ˆ () i x m    25
private consumption of an agent  1,..., in = . To get some result on the possibility to implement 
of ( ) s Pm we have to assume that private consumption has a lower bound when the number of 
replications goes to infinity. This assumption, however, is rather weak and, e.g., fulfilled 
when preferences are of Cobb-Douglas type.  
 
Assumption LB: If the replication factor m  increases, then each agent i´s ( 1,..., in = ) private 
consumption in  ( ) s Pm is strictly bounded away from zero, i.e.,  { } 1 1,...,
ˆˆ : min ( ),..., ( ) 0 n in
m






Given this assumption we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 12: Given assumption LB, for any  0 ε >  there is a replication factor  ( ) m ε  such 
that for any income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n ww  with  ˆ (1 ) ( ) ii wx m ε >+  for all  1,..., in =  the Pareto 
optimal allocation  ( ) s Pm can be implemented as an interior matching equilibrium by a W-
scheme.  
Proof: We distinguish two cases depending on whether the size n of the original economy is 
even or odd and then construct a matching mechanism which has the local Warr neutrality 
property in the following way. 
(i) If n is even we arbitrarily split up the original economy in 
2
n
k =  subgroups of size 2 in 
which there is pairwise matching. To attain  ( ) s Pm the matching rate of each agent then has to 
be ( ) 1 1 mm n μ =⋅ − >  for any agent i if agent  j  is in the same group but zero if agent  j  is in 
another subgroup. For any subgroup  1,..., lk =  let 
() l
i w  denote the income of each of its two 
members 1,2 i = , 
() ˆ ()
l
i x m  their levels of private consumption in  ( ) s Pm and 
() ˆ ()
l
i zm = 
() () ˆ ()
ll
ii wx m −  their spending for the public good if the replication factor is m . To find out 
whether this matching mechanism in fact implements  ( ) s Pm for the given income distribution 
we apply Proposition 6. This means that we must check whether the system of the two 
equations 
   
(32-1)                                 
() () ()
12 1 ˆ () ()
ll l y my z m μ +=  
(32-2)                                 
() () ()
21 2 ˆ () ()
ll l ym y z m μ +=  
   26
has strictly positive solutions in 
()
1
l y  and 
()
2
l y . Quite analogous to condition (16-2) which 
applies when the whole economy only consists of two agents this is the case if and only if 













μ <        and 













μ < . 
Now for any given  0 ε >  we choose  
(34)                                                  
1














=∑  is the total income in the original n -person economy and x is the 
lower bound for individual private consumption according to assumption LB. Then we can 
make the following estimate when, as in the Proposition, 22 ˆ (1 ) ( ) wx m ε >+  is assumed: 
 
(35)      
()
1
() () () () ()
22 2 2 2
ˆ ()
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () ( 1 ) () ()
l
ll l l l
zm W W













<< ⋅ − = . 
 
In (35) the last inequality is implied by the choice of  ( ) m ε  as described by (34). This gives 
condition (33-1). The other condition (33-2) follows in a quite analogous way from the 
assumption  11 ˆ (1 ) ( ) wx m ε >+  which proves Proposition 12 when n is even.  







−=  subgroups  1,..., 1 ik =−  of 
size 2 in which there is pairwise matching as in part (i) of the proof and the subgroup k  with 
three members. (In the case  3 n =  there is only this group with three members.) For any 
replication factor m   the matching mechanism for this group k   is given by the following 
33 × -transformation matrix: 
 
(36)                                             
()
1( ) 1















To show that  ( ) s Pm  is implemented by the matching mechanism thus described, for the 
subgroups 1,..., 1 lk =−  of size 2 the same conditions as in part (i) must hold such that the   27
argument is completely identical. For subgroup k , however, the implementability condition 
on the income levels 
() ( ) ( )
12 3 (,,)
kll www and the concomitant values 
() ( ) ( )
12 3 ˆˆˆ (,,)
kll zzz now is that the 
system of the three equations  
 
(36-1)                                             
() () ()
12 1 ˆ ()
kk k y my z μ +=  
(36-2)                                             
() () ()
23 2 ˆ ()
kk k y my z μ +=  
(36-3)                                             
() () ()
31 3 ˆ ()
kk k ym y z μ +=  
 






k y  and 
()
3
k y . A short 
calculation shows that the solutions of (36-1), (36-2) and (36-3) are given by  
 
























i ym > %  (where  1 1,2,3 i = ) it is thus 
sufficient that 















μ <  
if either  23 (,) ii is (2,3), (3,1) or (1,2). Now for any  0 ε >  the replication factor  () m ε  is again 
chosen according to eq. (34). Then condition (38) is fulfilled which follows in quite the same 
way as in case (i).    
The transformation matrix of the matching mechanism constructed in (i) and (ii) is non-
singular. This follows in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 9 since the 
transformation matrices for the subgroups of two and the subgroup of three agents are non-
singular. Local Warr neutrality and thus uniqueness then is implied by Proposition 7.    QED                         
    Similar as in Definition 3, the set of income distributions  1 ( ,..., ) n ww  for which  ˆ () ii wx m >  
holds for all  1,..., in =  is denoted by  ( ) s m Π . Analogously, let  ( ) s m Ω  be the set of income 
distributions  1 ( ,..., ) n ww  for  which  ( ) s Pm   is implemented by the matching mechanism 
constructed in the proof of Proposition 12. Then the result given by Proposition 12 may also 
be interpreted by saying that the set of income distributions  ( ) s m Ω  converges to  ( ) s m Π  
when the replication factor m   goes to infinity. This means that in large economies the   28
additional restrictions on income distributions to make  ( ) s Pm  implementable  are  less 
restrictive than in a small economy. Remember that we have seen in our analysis of the case 
2 n =   in Section 4 that implementation of  (2) s P   is only feasible for a single income 
distribution. That implementation becomes easier when the size of the economy grows 
contradicts in some sense a hypothesis formulated by Brunner and Falkinger (1999, p. 359) 
which states that having no free riders under a given matching mechanism is “plausible if the 
number of the individuals in the economy is small”.  
    For the subgroups with two agents that played the central role in the proof of Proposition 
12, the result of this Proposition can easily be visualized by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Change of  1() m l  and  2() m l  with  () m μ  going to infinity. 
 
In this figure, similar as in Figure 2 of Section 4, conditions (33-1) and (33-2) imply that all 
income distributions in  ( ) s m Ω  must lie below the straight line  1() m l  with slope  () m μ  and 
above the straight line  2() m l  with  slope 
1
() m μ
. Since  ( ) m μ   goes to infinity if m  is 
increased the segment  ()() B mCm  which  describes  ( ) s m Ω   approximates the segment 













2 ˆ x  29
8. Conclusion 
Reciprocal matching in a public good economy has become an important topic in public good 
theory that, in the context with the pertinent political task to overcome underprovision of 
global public goods, also is of empirical importance. As an instrument for improving public 
good provision in a world without a well-established central government matching promises 
to combine different attractive features. On the one hand, it helps to avoid problems of 
asymmetric information about individual costs and benefits of the public good that exist 
between the participating agents and the central agency. The reason is that Pareto optimal 
allocation may be attained by rather schematic types of matching mechanisms for which 
specific knowledge about the agents is not important. On the other hand, there is no need for a 
central agency that – as in the case of a domestic government – directly has to enforce the 
public good contributions of the agents. Instead the agents still make their independent 
choices, and it only has to be ensured that while doing this, they really observe the rules of the 
matching mechanism.  
     Apart from these advantages of matching the literature, however, has also identified some 
obstacles that may impede the application of a matching mechanism. So above all it has been 
shown that for some simple and otherwise appealing mechanisms the matching equilibria are 
not unique which at least demands some additional coordination efforts of the agents. Against 
this background the main message of our paper is that beyond uniqueness there are other 
severe problems with the functioning of matching schemes. So existence of interior matching 
equilibria in which all agents voluntarily make a positive contribution to the public good is 
not guaranteed but – depending on the precise form of the mechanism – requires quite specific 
distributions of initial income. Therefore, in order to make a matching scheme workable, 
some redistribution of income among the agents may be warranted at first. To find an 
appropriate income distribution, however, will not be possible without detailed knowledge 
about the agents´ characteristics which reduces the informational advantages of matching. 
Moreover, as we have also shown in our analysis, there is a non-negligible danger that only 
slightly missing the appropriate income distributions will inevitably lead the matching 
equilibrium away from the desired solution. The problem of local Warr non-neutrality can be 
avoided if only matching mechanisms are used that fulfil a certain regularity condition which, 
interestingly, coincides with that for uniqueness. Therefore there is a double advantage of 
applying regular matching mechanisms.  
    The class of matching mechanisms that provide Warr neutrality and uniqueness is much 
larger than that on which the previous literature has focused, i.e., the class of matching   30
schemes where reciprocal matching only occurs within distinct groups. An alternative is, e.g., 
to restrict active payments into the matching scheme to some group of donors whereas the 
other members of the economy outside this group only receive matching grants out of the 
scheme. We have also seen that in very small economies it is quite unlikely that a Pareto 
optimal allocation is attained through matching. But if the size of the economy is increased, 
e.g., by replication of the original economy, then - by application of a specifically constructed 
matching mechanism - the set of income distributions which allows for implementation of 
Pareto optimal allocations will be growing, too. Thus it is a main and not quite unsurprising 
insight of our paper that matching may work better in large than in small economies. 
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 and  1 μ ≠ , then det 0 M ≠ . 
Proof: We have by standard rules for calculation of determinants 
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1 1( 1 )
nn μ
− =+− . Thus, if n   is an odd number 
det 0 M >  holds for any μ , if n is an even number det 0 M ≠  holds if  1 μ ≠ .   31
Appendix A2 
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If 0 μ > , then this expression clearly is non-zero if and only if  1 μ ≠ . 
   32
References 
Althammer, W. and Buchholz, W. (1993), Lindahl-Equilibria as the Outcome of a Non-
cooperative Game, European Journal of Political Economy 9: 399-405.  
Andreoni, J. and Bergstrom, T.C. (1996), Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private 
Supply of Public Goods?, Public Choice 88: 295-308.  
Bergstrom, T.C.; Blume, L. and Varian, H. (1986), On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 
Journal of Public Economics 29: 25-49. 
Barrett, S. (1990), The Problem of Global Environmental Protection, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 6: 68-79. 
Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P. and Wildasin, D. (1989), Tax-transfer Policies and the Voluntary 
Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics 39: 157-176. 
Boadway, R.; Song, Z. and Tremblay, J.-F. (2007), Commitment and Matching Contributions 
to Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics 91: 1664-1683. 
Buchholz, W.; Cornes, R.C. and Peters, W. (2006), On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-
Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy, Journal of Public Economic Theory 8: 
401-408. 
Cornes, R.C. (2009), The Voluntary Contribution Model of Public Goods, The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition. 
Cornes, R.C. and Hartley, R. (2003), Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests, Public 
Choice 117: 1-25. 
Cornes, R.C. and Hartley, R. (2007), Aggregative Public Good Games, Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 9: 201-219. 
Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1985), The Simple Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision, 
Economica 52: 103-116. 
Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1989), Public Goods, Growth, and Welfare, Social Choice and 
Welfare 6: 243-251. 
Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1996), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club 
Goods, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
Danziger, L. and Schnytzer, A. (1991), Implementing the Lindahl Voluntary-exchange 
Mechanism, European Journal of Political Economy 7: 55-64.  
Falkinger, J. (1996), Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods by Rewarding Deviations 
from Average, Journal of Public Economics 62: 413-422.  
Falkinger, J. and Brunner, J.K. (1999), Taxation in an Economy with Private Provision of 
Public Goods, Review of Economic Design 4: 357–379. 
Falkinger, J.; Hackl, F. and Pruckner, G.J. (1996), A Fair Mechanism for Efficient Reduction 
of Global CO2-emissions, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 53: 308-331. 
Guttman, J.M. (1978), Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior, American 
Economic Review 68: 251-255.  
Guttman, J.M. (1987), A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action, Economica 54: 
1-19.  
Ihori, T. (1996), International Public Goods and Contribution Productivity Differentials, 
Journal of Public Economics 61: 139-154.   33
Kirchsteiger, G. and Puppe, C. (1997), On the Possibility of Efficient Private Provision of 
Public Goods through Government Subsidies, Journal of Public Economics 66: 489-
504.  
Kotchen, M.J. (2009), Voluntary Provision of Public Goods for Bads: A Theory of 
Environmental Offsets, Economic Journal 119: 883-899. 
Lindahl, E. (1919), Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Glerupska Universitets Bokhandeln 
(Lund). 
Nordhaus, W.D. (2006), After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming, 
American Economic Review 96: 31-34. 
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 
MA). 
Pigou, A.C. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan (London). 
Roberts, R.D. (1987), Financing Public Goods, Journal of Political Economy 95: 420-437. 
Roberts, R.D. (1992), Government Subsidies to Private Spending on Public Goods, Public 
Choice 74: 133-152. 
Sandler, T. (1992), Collective Action: Theory and Applications, Harvester Wheatsheaf (New 
York et al.) 
Shrestha, R.K. and Cheong, K.S. (2007), An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free 
Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance 
Analysis 63: 278-284. 
Varian, H. (1994a), Sequential Contributions to Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics 
53: 165-186. 
Varian, H. (1994b), A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-
informed, American Economic Review 84: 1278-1293. 
Warr, P.G. (1982), Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity, Journal of Public 
Economics 19: 131-138. 
Warr, P.G. (1983), The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution 
of Income, Economics Letters 13: 207-211. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2821 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, The Political Economy of Conscription, October 
2009 
 
2822 Steinar Holden and Åsa Rosén, Discrimination and Employment Protection, October 
2009 
 
2823 David G. Mayes, Banking Crisis Resolution Policy – Lessons from Recent Experience – 
Which elements are needed for robust and efficient crisis resolution?, October 2009 
 
2824 Christoph A. Schaltegger, Frank Somogyi and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Tax Competition and 
Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area, October 2009 
 
2825 Natasa Bilkic, Thomas Gries and Margarethe Pilichowski, Stay in School or Start 
Working? – The Human Capital Investment Decision under Uncertainty and 
Irreversibility, October 2009 
 
2826 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Worker-Specific Effects of Globalisation, 
October 2009 
 
2827 Alexander Fink and Thomas Stratmann, Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: 
The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints, October 2009 
 
2828 Wolfgang Ochel and Anja Rohwer, Reduction of Employment Protection in Europe: A 
Comparative Fuzzy-Set Analysis, October 2009 
 
2829 Rainald Borck and Martin Wimbersky, Political Economics of Higher Education 
Finance, October 2009 
 
2830 Torfinn Harding and Frederick van der Ploeg, Is Norway’s Bird-in-Hand Stabilization 
Fund Prudent Enough? Fiscal Reactions to Hydrocarbon Windfalls and Graying 
Populations, October 2009 
 
2831 Klaus Wälde, Production Technologies in Stochastic Continuous Time Models, October 
2009 
 
2832 Biswa Bhattacharyay, Dennis Dlugosch, Benedikt Kolb, Kajal Lahiri, Irshat 
Mukhametov and Gernot Nerb, Early Warning System for Economic and Financial 
Risks in Kazakhstan, October 2009 
 
2833 Jean-Claude Trichet, The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support, October 2009 
 
2834 Hans Gersbach, Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication, October 2009 
 
2835 Ansgar Belke, Gunther Schnabl and Holger Zemanek, Real Convergence, Capital 
Flows, and Competitiveness in Central and Eastern Europe, October 2009  
2836 Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to 
Environmental Valuation, October 2009 
 
2837 Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl, Green Serves the Dirtiest: On the 
Interaction between Black and Green Quotas, October 2009 
 
2838 Katarina Keller, Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, Does Military Draft Discourage 
Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries, October 2009 
 
2839 Giovanni Cespa and Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. 
Hayek, October 2009 
 
2840 Jan Boone and Jan C. van Ours, Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit 
Exhaustion?, October 2009 
 
2841 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel and Stephan L. Thomsen, Right-Wing Extremism and 
the Well-Being of Immigrants, October 2009 
 
2842 Andrea Weber and Christine Zulehner, Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are 
Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?, November 2009 
 
2843 Hadi Salehi Esfahani, Kamiar Mohaddes and M. Hashem Pesaran, Oil Exports and the 
Iranian Economy, November 2009 
 
2844 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, Firm-Specific Productivity Risk over the 
Business Cycle: Facts and Aggregate Implications, November 2009 
 
2845 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Burcu Erdogan and Vladimir Kuzin, Testing for 
Convergence in Stock Markets: A Non-Linear Factor Approach, November 2009 
 
2846 Michèle Belot and Jan Fidrmuc, Anthropometry of Love – Height and Gender 
Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages, November 2009 
 
2847 Volker Nitsch and Nikolaus Wolf, Tear Down this Wall: On the Persistence of Borders 
in Trade, November 2009 
 
2848 Jan K. Brueckner and Stef Proost, Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity, 
November 2009 
 
2849 Margarita Katsimi and Vassilis Sarantides, The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Profits, 
November 2009 
 
2850 Scott Alan Carson, The Relationship between Stature and Insolation: Evidence from 
Soldiers and Prisoners, November 2009 
 
2851 Horst Raff and Joachim Wagner, Intra-Industry Adjustment to Import Competition: 
Theory and Application to the German Clothing Industry, November 2009 
 
2852 Erkki Koskela, Impacts of Labor Taxation with Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive 
Labor Markets under Flexible Outsourcing, November 2009  
2853 Cletus C. Coughlin and Dennis Novy, Is the International Border Effect Larger than the 
Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade, November 2009 
 
2854 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Source versus Residence Based Taxation with 
International Mergers and Acquisitions, November 2009 
 
2855 Andreas Hoffmann and Gunther Schnabl, A Vicious Cycle of Manias, Crashes and 
Asymmetric Policy Responses – An Overinvestment View, November 2009 
 
2856 Xavier Vives, Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information, 
November 2009 
 
2857 M. Hashem Pesaran and Paolo Zaffaroni, Optimality and Diversifiability of Mean 
Variance and Arbitrage Pricing Portfolios, November 2009 
 
2858 Davide Sala, Philipp J.H. Schröder and Erdal Yalcin, Market Access through Bound 
Tariffs, November 2009 
 
2859 Ben J. Heijdra and Pim Heijnen, Environmental Policy and the Macroeconomy under 
Shallow-Lake Dynamics, November 2009 
 
2860 Enrico Spolaore, National Borders, Conflict and Peace, November 2009 
 
2861 Nina Czernich, Oliver Falck, Tobias Kretschmer and Ludger Woessmann, Broadband 
Infrastructure and Economic Growth, December 2009 
 
2862 Evžen Kočenda and Martin Vojtek, Default Predictors and Credit Scoring Models for 
Retail Banking, December 2009 
 
2863 Christian Gollier and Martin L. Weitzman, How Should the Distant Future be 
Discounted when Discount Rates are Uncertain?, December 2009 
 
2864 Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn, Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability, 
December 2009 
 
2865 Torfinn Harding and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, A Touch of Sophistication: FDI and 
Unit Values of Exports, December 2009 
 
2866 Matthias Dischinger and Nadine Riedel, There’s no Place like Home: The Profitability 
Gap between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries, December 2009 
 
2867 Andreas Haufler and Frank Stähler, Tax Competition in a Simple Model with 
Heterogeneous Firms: How Larger Markets Reduce Profit Taxes, December 2009 
 
2868 Steinar Holden, Do Choices Affect Preferences? Some Doubts and New Evidence, 
December 2009 
 
2869 Alberto Asquer, On the many Ways Europeanization Matters: The Implementation of 
the Water Reform in Italy (1994-2006), December 2009 
  
2870 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad and Jakob De Haan, Financial Reform and Banking Crises, 
December 2009 
 
2871 Annette Alstadsæter and Hans Henrik Sievertsen, The Consumption Value of Higher 
Education, December 2009 
 
2872 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 
Collective Labor Supply of Native Dutch and Immigrant Households in the 
Netherlands, December 2009 
 
2873 Burkhard Heer and Alfred Maußner, Computation of Business-Cycle Models with the 
Generalized Schur Method, December 2009 
 
2874 Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian and Massimo Tavoni, Human Capital Formation and 
Global Warming Mitigation: Evidence from an Integrated Assessment Model, 
December 2009 
 
2875 André Grimaud, Gilles Lafforgue and Bertrand Magné, Climate Change Mitigation 
Options and Directed Technical Change: A Decentralized Equilibrium Analysis, 
December 2009 
 
2876 Angel de la Fuente, A Mixed Splicing Procedure for Economic Time Series, December 
2009 
 
2877 Martin Schlotter, Guido Schwerdt and Ludger Woessmann, Econometric Methods for 
Causal Evaluation of Education Policies and Practices: A Non-Technical Guide, 
December 2009 
 
2878 Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest and Andreas Peichl, Automatic Stabilizers and Economic 
Crisis: US vs. Europe, December 2009 
 
2879 Tom Karkinsky and Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent 
Location within Multinational Firms, December 2009 
 
2880 Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath and Wieland Müller, Taxation and Market Power, 
December 2009 
 
2881 Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Stimmelmayr, Corporate Taxation and Corporate 
Governance, December 2009 
 
2882 Gebhard Kirchgässner, The Lost Popularity Function: Are Unemployment and Inflation 
no longer Relevant for the Behaviour of Germany Voters?, December 2009 
 
2883 Marianna Belloc and Ugo Pagano, Politics-Business Interaction Paths, December 2009 
 
2884 Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke, Existence and Warr Neutrality 
for Matching Equilibria in a Public Good Economy: An Aggregative Game Approach, 
December 2009 